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INTRODUCTION 
he purpose of this article is to show how freedom of 
information and open government have come under 
pressure in Denmark. Denmark has traditionally been 
known as a very open society. However, recent developments have 
challenged Denmark’s commitment to giving the public access to 
information, as well as its commitment to open government. The 
questions have arisen because of changed security situation 
following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, increased EU cooperation 
since the EU system has traditionally provided less public access to 
information than the Danish system, and recent amendments to 
the Danish Public Records Act that limit public access to internal 
documents that detail or describe political decision-making. 
Obviously, some of the mentioned challenges are general concerns 
in many Western democracies. 
§ 1 – A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF FREEDOM 
OF INFORMATION IN DENMARK 
Denmark has a long tradition of providing the public with access 
to governmental information.2 As far back as 1866, Denmark 
provided a limited right of access to information for parties 
involved in administrative cases. This right of access was 
strengthened in 1964. In 1970, the Public Records Act which 
provided everyone with access to governmental information. The 
Public Records Act was strengthened in 1987. And, then, in 
January 2014 a new and much debated Public Records Act came 
into force.  
Under the Danish constitutional system, the public’s right to 
information does not have a constitutional basis. The right to 
expression is explicitly provided for in Article 77 of the 
Constitution. Hence, the right to information is regulated by 
statutory law and by the European Convention of Human Rights.   
                                                
1 The author would like to thank research student, Jens Christian Dalsgaard, Centre for 
Comparative and European Constitutional Studies (CECS), Faculty of Law, University 
of Copenhagen, for assistance with search of legal sources and research on information 
for the article. 
2 See STEEN RØNSHOLDT, FORVALTNINGSRET, 4th edition, 2014, p. 308. 
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§ 2 – WHY IS FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IMPORTANT? 
An explanation for Denmark’s commitment to access to 
information is provided in Article 1 of the new Danish Public 
Records Act. That Act provides that: 
“The purpose of this Act is to secure openness with public 
authorities, etc., for the purpose mainly of supporting: 
1) The right to information and the right to expression 
2) The citizens’ participation in the democracy 
3) The public’s control of the public administration 
4) The media’s dissemination of the information, and 
Trust in the public administration” 
In other words, the right to information is an important 
component of an open and enlightened democracy that values 
active citizen participation. 
§ 3 – CONFLICTING CONSIDERATIONS 
Of course, in no country is the right to access governmental 
information regarded as absolute. Although Article 1 of the Public 
Records Act lists the values that underlie the right to access 
information, there are competing considerations that tend to limit 
access, including the government’s desire to shield information 
from disclosure that affects: 
1) State security; 
2) Defense; 
3) Foreign policy; 
4) Governmental decision-making processes 
All of these considerations have resulted in exceptions to the right 
to information as set forth in the Act.  
In other words, even though the right to access information is 
regarded as important in a democratic society, and promotes a 
number of important values (as discussed earlier), that right has 
never been regarded as absolute. On the contrary, the right to 
access information must be weighed against other competing 
values. As a result, the right of access is not a “stable” right in the 
sense that the scope of right to information available to the public 
may vary depending on the present state of state security, defense 
policy and foreign policy, and, of course, each of those situations 
can be affected by developments in the world. 
Furthermore, many of these competing considerations involve 
threat assessments which are usually kept confidential for security 
reasons, and therefore are not available to the public. Obviously, 
this situation tends to empower public authorities who are vested 
with extensive powers since they alone are allowed to decide when 
state security, defense policy and foreign policy considerations 
require abrogation of the right of access. Moreover, the citizenry 
often lacks the expertise and knowledge to second-guess the 
decisions of governmental officials. Of course, as the world 
becomes more globalized, officials increasingly rely on such 
exceptions to shield information from the public. 
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In the following sections, we look more closely at some of the 
exceptions and the developments in an effort to gain insight into 
how these exceptions affect the public’s right to access 
governmental information. 
A) The Post 9/11 Area 
As is common knowledge, the 9/11 terrorist attacks provided a 
stimulus for the enactment of anti-terrorism legislation in the 
western world. This legislation has had an adverse impact on 
traditional human rights, including for example the right to privacy. 
How is then the right to information adversely affected by these 
trends? In a number of ways. 
First, huge amounts of information are secretly gathered by 
intelligence services.3 In the U.S., Edward Snowden, a former 
National Security Agency (NSA) contractor exposed the U.S.’s 
secret cybersurveillance program. In general the public has no right 
to access information about this program, and that includes both 
the general public as well as those people who are being monitored 
under the program.4 In Denmark, it is not even possible for the 
public to find out whether the intelligence services is maintaining 
records on them, even if the request does not seek access to the 
content of the file.5 Prior 2014, public access to information from 
the Intelligence Services was regulated by the Public Records Act, 
but is now regulated by the Act on the Security and Intelligence 
Service and the Act on the Defense Intelligence Service. However, 
before the amendments to these Acts took effect in 2014 the two 
intelligence services routinely denied requests to access this type of 
information under the Public Records Act.6 This means that in 
reality the Intelligence Services have always been very secrecy 
about their work and hence public access in this field has been 
strongly limited. After the 9/11 attacks, more money and resources 
were allocated to the Intelligence Services, and they were allowed 
to shield more information from public scrutiny. 
Second, in this area, few control mechanisms have been placed on 
the actions of authorities. The Danish Parliament has a small 
committee which has the right to require and review all documents 
held by the Security and Intelligence Service and the Defense 
                                                
3 See also below on big-data surveillance. 
4 As regards the Danish Security and Intelligence Service see Article 12 of the Act on the 
Security and Intelligence Service, Act No. 604 of 12 June 2013. As regards the Defense 
Intelligence Service see Article 9 of the Act on the Defense Intelligence Service, Act 
No. 602 of 12 June 2013.   
5 As regards the Danish Security and Intelligence Service this follows from Article 12 of 
the Act on the Security and Intelligence Service, Act No. 604 of 12 June 2013. As regards 
the Defense Intelligence Service it follows from Article 9 of the Act on the Defense 
Intelligence Service, Act No. 602 of 12 June 2013. However, it is possible to request a 
special supervisory committee to investigate whether information is ineligibly being held 
by the two intelligence services, see Article 13 of the Act on the Security and Intelligence 
Service, Act No. 604 of 12 June 2013, and Article 10 of the Act on the Defense 
Intelligence Service, Act No. 602 of 12 June 2013.  
6 This follows from the travaux préparatoires of the Act on the Security and Intelligence 
Service, Act No. 604 of 12 June 2013, bullet 7.1 and of the Act on the Defense 
Intelligence Service, Act No. 602 of 12 June 2013, bullet 6.1.  
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Intelligence Service.7 However, given the level of monitoring being 
done by these services, Parliamentary control only provides a 
limited check. There are various problems. How does Parliament 
know which documents to demand? Furthermore, since members 
of the committee are subject to a duty of confidentiality, they 
cannot reveal what they know to the public, and thus start a public 
debate regarding the surveillance program. That said, a new 
independent supervisory committee was established in 2014 which 
has its own secretariat. The members are appointed by the Minister 
of Justice after negotiations with the Minister of Defense. The 
committee supervises the Security and Intelligence Service and the 
Defense Intelligence Service. Importantly, the committee can 
require the services to submit information, documents and 
materials, and the committee has a right to access buildings of the 
intelligence services without a court order.8 The new supervisory 
committee replaces the old so called “Wamberg Committee” which 
was created by administrative decision.9 The new committee 
strengthens governmental control of the intelligence services. For 
instance, the committee’s competence is broader than that of the 
prior committee.10 However, the two committees function 
somewhat differently. Whereas the old “Wamberg Committee” 
conducted ex ante control, and was asked to give prior approval 
regarding the registration of Danish citizens and foreigners, the 
new committee exercises only post decisional authority.11 Though 
the purpose of establishing this new committee was to strengthen 
control over the Danish Security and Intelligence Service, the 
reform has been criticized for being unambitious compared to the 
reforms adopted by other countries. 12 A third method of control 
is provided by the Ombudsman. 
As a general rule, if the Security and Intelligence Service’s 
investigation will violate the right to privacy, protected by 
Article 72 of the Constitution, the service must first obtain a court 
order before beginning the investigation.13 Furthermore, in order 
to obtain the order, the Intelligence Service must be able to 
demonstrate that it has a concrete suspicion regarding the person(s) 
being investigated, and it must prove that violation of the 
constitutional provision is crucial to the investigation, and the 
                                                
7 See Consolidation Act on the Establishment of a Committee on the Defense and Police 
Intelligence Services, Consolidation Act No. 937 of 26 August 2014 Article 2, part 3.  
8 See Act on the Security and Intelligence Service, Act No. 604 of 12 June 2013, Article 10, 
and Act on the Defense Intelligence Service, Act No. 602 of 12 June 2013, Article 17. 
9 See Henrik Hjorth Elmquist and Thomas Klyver, Ny lovgivning om Politiets 
Efterretningstjeneste og den parlamentariske kontrol med efterretningstjenesten, 
JURISTEN, No. 6, 2013, p. 273.   
10 See ibid, p. 273. 
11 See ibid, p. 273. 
12 See for instance Pernille Boye Koch, Reform af PET – styrket demokratisk kontrol?, in Hans 
Viggo Pedersen (ed.), Juridiske emner ved Syddansk Universitet 2013, 2013, pp. 277-285, 
and Pernille Boye Koch, Ministeransvaret og tilsyn med PET – et uløseligt dilemma?, Ugeskrift 
for Retsvæsen, 2012, Afdeling B, pp. 377-385.   
13 See Administration of Justice Act, Consolidation Act No. 1308 of 9 December 2014, 
Article 783. 
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investigation itself must involve a severe crime.14 Finally, the 
violation of the constitutional right must be proportional to the 
threatened harm.15 The court order may be issued in secret, and the 
person who is the object of the privacy violation is not allowed to 
be present. However, he may be represented by an attorney.16 In 
emergency situations, when it is not possible to wait for a court 
order, the police may act immediately and seek court approval 
afterwards.17 The regulation on court orders contained in the 
Administration of Justice Act does not apply to the Defense 
Intelligence Service.18 
Third, since terrorism is a threat that crosses international borders, 
Denmark’s investigation and intelligence services are allowed to 
work across borders. Since terrorism can involve both an internal 
and an external threat, the Security and Intelligence Service (which 
is part of the police and deals with internal threats) and the Defense 
Intelligence Service (which is part of the military and deals with 
external threats) are involved in the fight against terrorism 
necessitating closer cooperation between them. Before 9/11, the 
legislation regulating these two intelligence services erected the 
functional equivalent of a Chinese wall between the two services in 
regard to the exchange of information. However, after 9/11 the 
two branches cooperate more freely and exchange information 
between themselves. 
One consequence of this increased level of communication is that 
information that has been collected by the Defense Intelligence 
Service without a court order (since that is not required for that 
branch of the intelligence service)19 can be passed on to the Security 
and Intelligence Service when it is important to the conduct of that 
agency’s tasks.20 Information can be transmitted between the 
services even though the Security and Intelligence Service could 
not have collected that information itself without a court order.21 
Interestingly, before 2006, the Defense Intelligence Service could 
only collect information on events that occurred abroad when 
those events could have an impact on Danish security. However, 
in 2006, the Defense Intelligence Service was provided with 
increased competences because of new anti-terror legislation. 
                                                
14 See Administration of Justice Act, Consolidation Act No. 1308 of 9 December 2014, 
Article 781. 
15 See Administration of Justice Act, Consolidation Act No. 1308 of 9 December 2014, 
Article 782. 
16 See Administration of Justice Act, Consolidation Act No. 1308 of 9 December 2014, 
Article 784. 
17 See Administration of Justice Act, Consolidation Act No. 1308 of 9 December 2014, 
Article 783. 
18 See Betænkning om PET og FE, No. 1529, 2012, p. 593, and Jens Elo Rytter, 
Våbenbrødre – efterretningsvirksomhed I USA og Danmark, in Peter Blume and Carsten 
Henrichsen (ed.): Forvaltning og retssikkerhed, 2014, p. 382. 
19 See Betænkning om PET og FE, No. 1529, 2012, p. 593, and Jens Elo Rytter, 
Våbenbrødre – efterretningsvirksomhed I USA og Danmark, in Peter Blume and Carsten 
Henrichsen (ed.): Forvaltning og retssikkerhed, 2014, p. 382. 
20 See Act on the Defense Intelligence Service, Article 7, Part 1.  
21 This aspect has been emphasized by the former leader of the Security and Intelligence 
Service Hans Jørgen Bonnichsen, see: 
http://www.dr.dk/Nyheder/Indland/2012/12/27/133626.htm. 
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Hence, in performing its duties, the Defense Intelligence Service 
may now also collect information on Danish citizens and persons 
staying in Denmark.22 This change increases the amounts of data 
that the Defense Intelligence Service may collect and gives its 
activities a more national scope. When considered along with its 
new competence to transfer relevant information to the Security 
and Intelligence Service, a competence added in 2006,23 there are 
far more opportunities to branches of the intelligence service to 
transfer information between themselves. 
However, it is important to emphasize that information also flows 
from the Security and Intelligence Service to the Defense 
Intelligence Service. In 2006, a new provision introduced in the 
Administration of Justice Act, Article 116 authorized the Security 
and Intelligence Service to transfer information to the Defense 
Intelligence Service. The introduction of Article 116 was adopted 
as part of a larger anti-terror legislation package.24 Under 
Article 116, Part 1, the Security and Intelligence Service can 
transfer information to the Defense Intelligence Service when such 
a transfer of information is important for the conduct of its tasks. 
With the new Act on the Security and Intelligence Service, which 
came into force 1 January 2014, the content of Article 116 has been 
transferred to Article 10, Part 1, of the new Act.25 In conclusion, 
since 2006 the free flow of information between the two 
intelligence services has increased.  
Since the Defense Intelligence Service and the Security and 
Intelligence Service also exchange information with Intelligence 
Services in foreign nations, information now flows more freely 
within Denmark as well as across the Danish border.26 Of course, 
this means that information about Danish citizens and persons 
who have at some point stayed in Denmark is undoubtedly also 
held by foreign Intelligence Services. 
As regards big-data surveillance, as a result of the EU Data 
Retention Directive 2006/24, Danish private providers of 
telecommunication are required to register meta-date, and they 
                                                
22 See Act on Amendment of the Act on the Purpose, Tasks and Organization, etc., of the 
Defense, Act No. 568 of 9 June 2006, on the new Article 116, Part 3, and Henrik 
Stevnsborg, Politiet og de “asymmetriske og uforudsigelige trusler”, Retfærd, issue, 3, 2008, p. 59. 
23 See Act on Amendment of the Act on the Purpose, Tasks and Organization, etc., of the 
Defense, Act No. 568 of 9 June 2006, on the new Article 116, Part 4. 
24 See Act on Amendment of the Criminal Act, the Public Administration Act and a 
Number of Other Acts, Act No. 542 of 8 June 2006 and Act on Amendment of the 
Public Administration Act and a Number of Other Acts, Act No. 538 of 8 June 2006. As 
pointed out by Henrik Stevnsborg it is interesting that while most of the 2006 anti-terror 
package was introduced by Act on Amendment of the Public Administration Act and a 
Number of Other Acts, Act No. 538 of 8 June 2006, Article 116 was introduced by 
another piece of legislation namely Act on Amendment of the Criminal Act, the Public 
Administration Act and a Number of Other Acts, Act No. 542 of 8 June 2006. See Henrik 
Stevnsborg, Politiet og de “asymmetriske og uforudsigelige trusler”, Retfærd, issue, 3, 2008, p. 58. 
The first anti-terror legislation package was introduced in 2002.  
25 See Act on the Security and Intelligence Service, Act No. 604 of 12 June 2013, Article 10, 
Part 1. 
26 See Act on the Security and Intelligence Service, Act No. 604 of 12 June 2013, Article 10, 
Part 2, and Act on the Defense Intelligence Service, Act No. 602 of 12 June 2013, 
Article 7, Part 2. 
 Freedom of information and Open Government in Denmark: Progress or deterioration? –
Helle Krunke 
– 71 – 
International Journal of Open Government 
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php?journal=RIGO 
have registered approximately 900 billion bits per year.27 As noted, 
the Security and Intelligence Service must obtain a court order in 
order to access this information. However, the Defense 
Intelligence Service also collects large amounts of information 
which is referred to as “raw data”.28 The Defense Intelligence 
Service does not need a court order to collect this data. 
Finally, it should be noted that the Danish Public Records Act 
excludes the records of criminal investigations, in general including 
terrorism, from the right to access information.29 
In conclusion, because of the political reaction to the security 
situation created by the 9/11 attacks, the Intelligence Services have 
been given greater competences and provided with new tools for 
collecting information on Danish and foreign citizens. As they do, 
this information can now flow more freely between the Security 
and Intelligence Service and the Defense Intelligence Services, and 
there is no right of public access to this information, and no right 
to know whether the services are collecting and maintaining 
information about specific individuals. The amount of information 
in this field is growing and exchange of information takes place 
across borders. A new independent supervisory committee has 
been established in order to create more control and a committee 
placed under the Parliament also contributes to this.   
B) Enhanced EU Cooperation 
The Public Records Act’s exception against disclosure for foreign 
policy matters extends to, and includes, information related to EU 
cooperation.30 This means that the right to information is limited if 
confidentiality follows from EU obligations. Certain documents 
and information can therefore not be passed on to Danish or other 
EU citizens. For instance, according to a number of directives 
letters from the Commission cannot be made public without 
approval of the Commission itself.31 Furthermore, under 
Regulation 1049/2001, on public access to documents from the 
European Parliament, Council and Commission, these documents 
can only be made public by a member state if the relevant EU 
institution has been consulted first. 
This exception from public access extends to documents that 
might reveal Danish negotiating positions regarding EU matters.32 
Under this exception, EU policy positions on for instance new EU 
legislation can, according to the Public Records Act, be excluded 
from the right to information. 
                                                
27 See Jens Elo Rytter, Våbenbrødre – efterretningsvirksomhed I USA og Danmark, in Peter 
Blume and Carsten Henrichsen (ed.): Forvaltning og retssikkerhed, 2014, p. 384. 
28 See Betænkning om PET og FE, No. 1529, 2012, p. 452, and Jens Elo Rytter, 
Våbenbrødre – efterretningsvirksomhed I USA og Danmark, in Peter Blume and Carsten 
Henrichsen (ed.): Forvaltning og retssikkerhed, 2014, p. 382.  
29 See the Public Records Act, Act No. 606 of 12 June 2013, Article 19. 
30 See Public Records Act, Act No. 606 of 12 June 2013, Article 32, Part 1. 
31 See Public Records Act, Act No. 606 of 12 June 2013, Article 32, Part 1, and Steen 
Rønsholdt, Forvaltningsret, 4th edition, 2014, pp. 348-349. 
32 See STEEN RØNSHOLDT, FORVALTNINGSRET, 4th edition, 2014, p. 361. 
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Traditionally, the EU system has provided less public access to 
information than the Danish system, and the movement towards 
greater EU cooperation in more fields will result in less public 
access and a less open government. Although there is a movement 
towards greater openness regarding EU cooperation, the need for 
openness is heightened by the fact that more and more areas are 
becoming subject to EU cooperation and thus part of the EU 
system. Even given the trend towards greater openness in the EU, 
closer Danish EU cooperation has the effect of limiting Danish 
citizens’ access to information and their ability to gain insights into 
political decision-making. Obviously, if the EU system becomes 
more open and transparent, these concerns may be alleviated. Of 
course, since Danish internal legislation has moved Denmark to 
provide less access to information, there may be less conflict 
between the Danish and the EU political culture of open decision-
making.   
C) Extended Protection of Public Authorities’ Decision-
making Processes 
Denmark has adopted recent amendments to the Public Access 
Act that provide greater protections for public authorities’ political 
decision-making processes. The new Act has been strongly 
criticized by journalists, and has resulted in a public debate 
regarding the propriety of limiting access to public information 
regarding the legislative process in the ministries as well as 
regarding dialogues between the government and members of 
Parliament. The new legislation makes clear that the right to 
information does not extend to cases on legislation before a Bill 
has been read in Parliament.33 Under the new Act, there is no right 
to documents that have been drafted and exchanged between 
ministries and members of Parliament regarding legislation. 
However, the exception extends, not only to Bills, but also to 
“other corresponding political activities.”34 This exemption could 
extend to negotiations that could result in a legislative initiative, 
and well as negotiations that could result in general political 
initiatives other than legislation.35 The right to information does 
not include internal documents and information that is being 
exchanged at a point where there is a concrete assumption that a 
minister needs or will need the advice of civil servants in a 
subordinated government agency or in another ministry.36 
Furthermore, in the future, it will no longer be possible to access 
the calendars of ministers.37 These exemptions must be viewed 
from the perspective of Danish politics which has moved towards 
increasing politicization of the civil servants and where spin 
                                                
33 See Public Records Act, Act No. 606 of 12 June 2013, Article 20. 
34 See Public Records Act, Act No. 606 of 12 June 2013, Article 27, number 2. 
35 See Kristian Korfits Nielsen and Morten Niels Jakobsen, Den nye offentlighedslov – og 
følgelovgivningen, Juristen, issue 5, 2013, p. 40. 
36 See Public Records Act, Act No. 606 of 12 June 2013, Article 24, Part 1. 
37 See Public Records Act, Act No. 606 of 12 June 2013, Article 22. 
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doctors play an enhanced role.38 The new Danish Public Records 
Act was adopted with a large majority of the members of 
Parliament voting in favor.39 
§ 4 – STRENGTHENING OPEN GOVERNMENT 
Thus far, this article has focused on challenges to open 
government. However, it should be mentioned that Denmark is 
discussing new initiatives for creating more open government. For 
instance, at the moment, Danish politicians are debating new 
initiatives regarding providing financial support to political parties. 
The background for these debates is a report on openness and 
financial support to political parties written by a committee created 
by the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Economic and the 
Interior. In spring, 2015, the committee recommended more 
openness regarding financial support given to political parties. In 
particular, the committee has among others recommended that as 
regards all support above 20,000 kr., the specific amount must be 
made public. The President of the Danish Parliament and the 
Danish government agreed that the legislation should be altered to 
provide for greater openness.40 However, there is disagreement 
among political parties regarding whether such amendments are 
necessary. For example, some argue that Denmark already has one 
of the World’s lowest corruption indexes.41 Only time will tell 
whether the current legislation on financial party support will be 
amended to provide for greater openness and greater access to 
information.  
Even though the debate surrounding the new Public Records Act 
has focused on limitations to the right to information, the new Act 
actually also strengthens the right to information in a number of 
ways. Indeed, one goal of the reformation of the Public Records 
Act was to provide for greater openness and this purpose is, as 
shown earlier, reflected in the first Article of the Act.42 For 
instance, the scope of the Public Access Act was broadened to 
include more institutions within the scope of its coverage, 
including mixed public-private companies and institutions, etc., 
that have the right to make administrative decisions.43 Another 
example is an extended right to information regarding the top 
                                                
38 See also Bent Winther, Der findes en kur mod politiserede embedsmænd: Åbenhed, in Berlingske 
Politiko, 23 October 2014, and JESPER TYNELL, MØRKELYGTEN - EMBEDSMÆND 
FORTÆLLER OM POLITISK TILSKÆRING AF TAL, JURA OG FAKTA, Samfundslitteratur, 2014. 
39 Only 42 members out of 178 voted against the Bill. 
40 See http://www.bt.dk/politik/lykketoft-kraever-fuld-aabenhed-om-partistoette and 
http://www.justitsministeriet.dk/nyt-og-presse/pressemeddelelser/2015/regeringen-
%C3%B8nsker-nye-partist%C3%B8tteregler. 
41 See http://www.dr.dk/Nyheder/Politik/2015/03/24/171844.htm. 
42 See Kristian Korfits Nielsen and Morten Niels Jakobsen, Den nye offentlighedslov – og 
følgelovgivningen, Juristen, issue 5, 2013, p. 32. 
43 See Public Records Act, Act No. 606 of 12 June 2013, Article 3, Part 1, number 3, 
Article 4, Part 1, and Article 5, Part 1. 
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management contracts that reveal the general prioritization as 
regards a specific authority, institution, etc.44 
§ 5 – COMPARISON TO OTHER NORDIC COUNTRIES 
In general Nordic countries have a high level of openness and 
access to governmental information. However, in comparison with 
other Nordic countries Denmark is not one of the most open 
countries. For instance, in a comparative study published in 2014 
regarding journalist and citizen access to public authorities and 
politicians, Denmark ranked in general as the lowest Nordic 
country.45 The study included Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland 
and Iceland. Though, Denmark was at the top in certain areas, such 
as access to factual information to documents which contain 
confidential secret information (the confidential parts would be 
crossed out), the general picture was that the other Nordic 
countries guaranteed the public more openness and greater access 
to documents. The study among others emphasized that Denmark 
has a more closed legislative process than for instance Finland and 
Sweden; a tendency that was strengthened by the new Public 
Records Act on 1 January 2014.   
There are several explanations for the differences between 
Denmark and the other Nordic countries regarding openness and 
access to information. Although a variety of explanations could be 
given, this article will touch on only a few. First, Denmark has been 
a member of the EC/EU for a much longer period than the other 
Nordic EU member states (Sweden and Finland) and some of the 
Nordic countries are only part of EEA (Norway and Iceland). The 
most closed culture surrounding the decision-making processes in 
the EU has thus influenced Denmark for a much longer period of 
time. Second, Denmark has excised a much more activist foreign 
policy over the past 10-15 years than the other Nordic countries of 
which some function only even neutrally (Sweden). For example, 
Denmark has been involved in several military operations in the 
Middle East, including the war in Iraq where it fought alongside 
the U.S.. This intervention, coupled with the Danish “Cartoon 
crisis”46 has turned Denmark into a target for terrorism, as 
illustrated recently on 14-15 February 2015 when Denmark 
suffered a terrorist attack. Perhaps inspired by the shooting 
incident in Paris in January 2015, a man opened fire first at a debate 
meeting on art, blasphemy and freedom of expression (in which 
one of the original cartoonists and the French ambassador 
participated) and later in front of the Jewish Synagogue in 
Copenhagen altogether killing two people. 
                                                
44 See Public Records Act, Act No. 606 of 12 June 2013, Article 21, Part 4. More examples 
can be found in Kristian Korfits Nielsen and Morten Niels Jakobsen, Den nye offentlighedslov 
– og følgelovgivningen, Juristen, issue 5, 2013, pp. 32-50. 
45 See OLUF JØRGENSEN, OFFENTLIGHED I NORDEN, Nordicom, University of Göteborg, 
2014.  
46 A Danish newspaper, Jyllandsposten, printed some cartoons of the Prophet 
Mohammed on 15 September 2005. The cartoons offended Muslims all over the world 
and a political foreign affairs crisis arose.      
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Undoubtedly, the terrorism threat will naturally lead to restrictions 
on societal openness and citizens often tend to accept these 
limitations without questioning them. The impact of terrorism 
attacks is normally that the politicians supported by the citizens 
give more power to Intelligence Services. Following the February 
2015 terrorist attack in Denmark, the government introduced new 
political initiatives for fighting terrorism. The Danish government 
wants to strengthen the fight against terrorism with 970 million kr. 
over the next four years. Approximately 415 million will go to the 
Defense Intelligence Service and approximately 200 million to the 
Security and Intelligence Service. These initiatives had been 
planned for a long time before the terrorist attack. However, the 
attack led some political parties to propose even more tools for the 
police and the Intelligence Service for fighting terrorism. This 
political response suggests that human rights considerations and 
open government are not given high value by the public or 
politicians when terrorism strikes.   
Finally, it should be mentioned that even though Denmark has a 
higher level of terrorism threat than other Nordic countries, both 
Sweden and Norway, have also involved their military forces in the 
fight against terrorism even though the main responsibility for 
fighting terrorism rests with the police and even though concerns 
have been expressed. In Sweden the police are in charge and the 
military simply assists. Furthermore, in Sweden, involvement of the 
military requires concrete approval from the government.47             
CONCLUSION 
Denmark has a long tradition of openness and public access to 
information. However, this openness is under pressure from a 
number of factors, including the fight against terrorism which has 
had both internal and external effects. In addition, closer 
cooperation between the EU and Denmark has led to potential 
restrictions on openness and the right to information. Finally, 
internal factors, such as politicians’ desires to build a confidential 
room around their daily political decision-making processes, have 
led them to restrict access to information. As this article shows, 
safeguarding the right to information is an ongoing challenge and 










                                                
47 See Henrik Stevnsborg, Politiet og de “asymmetriske og uforudsigelige trusler”, Retfærd, issue, 
3, 2008, pp. 62-65. 
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